Abstract-We introduce a game theoretic framework for studying a restricted form of network coding in a general wireless network. The network is fixed and known, and the system performance is measured as the number of wireless transmissions required to meet n unicast demands. Game theory is here employed as a tool for improving distributed network coding solutions. We propose a framework that allows each unicast session to independently adjust his routing decision in response to local information. Specifically, we model the interactions of the unicast sessions as a noncooperative game. This approach involves designing both local cost functions and decision rules for the unicast sessions so that the resulting collective behavior achieves a desirable system performance in a shared network environment. We propose a family of cost functions and compare the performance of the resulting distributed algorithms to the best performance that could be found and implemented using a centralized controller. We focus on the performance of stable solutions -where stability here refers to a form of Nash equilibrium defined below. Results include bounds on the bestand worst-case stable solutions as compared to the optimal centralized solution. Results in learning in games prove that the best-case stable solution can be learned by self-interested players with probability approaching 1.
spectrum are distributed approaches like [8] , which tackle large optimization problems by treating nodes or possibly sessions as independent decision makers in a shared network environment. One advantage of distributed algorithms is the savings in computation and coordination achieved by taking a large central optimization problem and dividing it into smaller problems. One disadvantage of this approach is that dividing the central optimization problem in this fashion may induce suboptimal solutions since each individual problem is typically solved with incomplete information about the full problem, and independently choosing the best solution for each subproblem may yield inferior performance for the problem as a whole.
Recently, a branch of noncooperative game theory that focuses on coordination games has been proposed as a tool for cooperative control of distributed systems [1] , [10] . Cooperative control focuses on the design of autonomous agents to optimize a given global objective. Utilizing game theory for cooperative control, or robust distributed optimization, requires the following:
(i) Game design: The system designer must specify the set of decision makers, which we refer to as agents or players, and their respective actions. Each agent is assigned a local objective function that he seeks to optimize. (ii) Agent decision rules: The system designer must specify an iterative procedure for how each agent selects his respective action in response to local information. The goal is to design both the game and the agent decision rules such that the emergent global behavior is desirable with respect to the global objective. In this paper, we primarily focus on game design and appeal to the theory of learning in game for the agent decision rules. The theory of learning in games includes several agent decision rules, also referred to as distributed learning algorithms, that provide guarantees on the emergent global behavior. We direct the readers to [6] , [20] for a comprehensive review.
In this paper, we explore the applicability of noncooperative game theory for designing distributed algorithms for network coding in a wireless network. We formulate the network coding problem as a noncooperative game where the individual unicast sessions are designed as the self-interested decision makers. We propose a family of local objective functions aimed at minimizing total network power consumption using a simple form of network coding. These cost functions are designed without knowledge of the specific network or the demands traversing the network but with the aim of optimizing a centralized network objective when utilizing available distributed learning algorithms. We evaluate the desirability of the objective functions by examining the performance at the stable solutions, i.e, the equilibria.
Several papers have used game theoretic methods for analyzing network coding problems by viewing either the individual unicasts or individual nodes in the network as selfish decision makers [3] , [9] , [16] . Most of these results are only applicable in restricted settings, e.g., a single-source multicast [3] or a simple generalization of the butterfly network with two users [16] . The goal of this paper is to propose a new strategy for applying game theory in distributed control problems and explore the implications of this approach on a family of network coding problems.
II. BACKGROUND: NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES

A. Definitions
We consider a finite strategic-form game. The n players are represented by the set N := {I, ..., n }. Each player i E N has a finite action set Ai and a cost function J, : A ---+ JR where A = Al X ••• x An denotes the joint action set. We refer to a finite strategic-form game as "a game," and we sometimes use a single symbol, e.g., G, to represent the entire game, Le., the player set, N, action sets, Ai, and cost functions J i. The most well known form of an equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). An action profile a* E
A is called a pure Nash equilibrium iffor each player i E N, (1) A (pure) Nash equilibrium represents a scenario for which no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
It is well known that there are noncooperative games for which no pure Nash equilibrium exists. In this paper, we restrict our attention to a special class of games called potential games where a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Potential games impose a restriction on the admissible cost functions as summarized in the following definition. 
Definition 2 (Potential Games
The global function ¢ is called the potential function for game
G.
In potential games, any action profile minimizing the potential function is a pure Nash equilibrium, hence every potential game possesses at least one such equilibrium.
B. Cooperative Control Problems and Potential Games
The objective in cooperative control problems is to derive local control mechanisms for the individual players such that the players operate in a manner that collectively aids the desired global objective. In this paper, we focus on the problem of cooperative control using the framework of potential games as proposed in [10] . Let C : A ---+ JR represent the true global 1) The game (N, {Ai}, {J i}) is a potential game.
2) The Nash equilibria of the game (N,{Ai},{J i}) are efficient with respect to the global cost C.
A motivation for focusing on potential games is to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in such systems is important as it represents a form of a stable operating condition [1] , [10] . One approach for designing cost functions such that the resulting game is a potential game is to assign each player a cost function that reflects the player's marginal contribution to the true system cost C as proposed in [19] . The resulting cost functions are called the wonderful life cost functions. (3) then the resulting game is a potential game with potential function C.
Proposition 1 (Wonderful Life Cost
A second motivation for studying potential games is the availability of a wide variety of distributed learning algorithms for potential games that provide asymptotic guarantees on the collective behavior. Most of the learning algorithms available for potential games guarantee convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium [7] , [11] , [15] , [20] . Therefore, it is imperative that the Nash equilibria of the designed game are efficient with respect to the true global cost C. We gauge the efficiency using the well known worst case measures called the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) [17] . Let Q denote a set of games. For any particular game G E Q let E(G) denote the set of pure Nash equilibria, PoA(G) := maxaE £(G) c7~:2t) denote the price of anarchy and PoS(G) := minaE £(G) c7~:2t) denote the price of stability for the game G where a o p t E argmina*EA C(a*) is any optimal action profile. We define the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the set of games Q as PoA(Q) := sUPGEQ PoA(G) and PoS(Q) := sUPGEQ PoS(G) respectively. The wonderful life cost functions guarantee a price of stability of 1 since any action profile that minimizes the global cost function C is a pure Nash equilibrium. In general, the wonderful life cost functions does not provide any guarantees on the price of anarchy.
There are a class of distributed learning algorithms for potential games that provides a guarantee on the percentage of time that the joint action profile will minimize the potential function [4] , [5] , [13] . The existence of these algorithms suggests that the price of stability should be the core measure of efficiency and the cost function design in (3) is optimal since one can apply these algorithms to guarantee convergence to the best Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, the provable (6) convergence rates for these algorithms are not desirable [2] . It is important to note that the convergence rates are proved for a general class of games; therefore, the algorithms may perform significantly better than expected for a given problem. However, with this potential limitation in mind, we focus on designing cost functions that achieve the best possible tradeoff between the price of anarchy and price of stability.
III . A SIMPLE WIRELESS NETWORK CODING PROBLEM
We consider the distributed design of network codes for multiple unicasts in a shared wireless network. We restrict our attention to the simplest form of network codes, where any node relaying one message in each direction between a pair of neighboring nodes can reduce the power required for transmission by broadcasting the bit-wise binary sum of the received messages in a single transmission rather than transmitting the two messages sequentially. Each neighbor can then determine its intended message by adding the information that it sent to the received sum, as illustrated in Figure 1 . This type of coding is sometimes called "reverse carpooling" since it allows two flows to share a single transmission provided that the two flows traverse the node in opposite directions. The goal of our network code design for this wireless network is to minimize the power required to simultaneously satisfy a given collection of unicast flow demands. For simplicity, we measure the cost of a network coding solution by evaluating the number of transmissions per packet required under steady state flow conditions. The following notation helps make these ideas concrete. Suppose the network needs to be shared by a finite set of We use Ai to denote all paths from S i to t i available to player i and A = IT i Ai to denote the paths available to all players.
For analysis, it is convenient to label each transmission from V by the node from which the information was obtained and the node for which it is next intended so that we can recognize coding opportunities. To that end, let the detailed path of ai = { V I, V2, .. . , VlaiI} be defined as We assume that each vertex V E V has a cost C; : A --+ that measures the number of transmissions by that vertex necessary for any routing profile. For our problem, this cost takes on a simplified form that depends only on each player's transmission through the vertex v. Before defining the structure of the cost function for the reverse carpooling setting, we first introduce some notation. For a given routing profile a E A, let a ( a, v [v x, vy] ) be defined as the number of players sending information from V x to v y through v, i.e.,
I(ai)
:
a(a,v[vx, vy]) := I{i EN: v[vx,vy] E I(ai)}l . (4)
Using only reverse carpooling codes, the transmission cost at node V E V for profile a E A is defined as (5) 
Cv(a) := 2: max {a (a,v [vx,vy]} , a(a, v[ vy,v x])},
(v x ,v y)E .N'(v)2:x>y
where Vo := 0 and Vo E N(v) for all v. Hence, the power consumption at a vertex depends only on the number of players using each transmission through the vertex. The system cost for a routing profile a E A is
C(a) := 2: Cv(a) vEV
A global planner would like to use a profile a E A that minimizes the system cost.
IV. THE REVERSE CARPOOLING GAME In this section we model the reverse carpooling problem as a noncooperative game with player set N , action sets Ai , and system cost C in (6) . Modeling the reverse carpooling problem as a noncooperative game involves assigning each player a cost function that is appropriately aligned with the system cost. We henceforth refer to the reverse carpooling problem modeled as a noncooperative game as the reverse carpooling game.
Using the results from [19] , our initial design is to set each player's cost function as the wonderful life cost function. That is, for any player i EN, the cost associated with the action ai provided that all other players select the action a-i is the player's marginal contribution to C , which is given by (7) where the null action a? represents the situation where the player i sends no information through the network, i.e., a? = 0. By Proposition I, we know that this design results in a potential game with potential function C. In the reverse carpooling problem, each player's marginal contribution to the system cost takes the form
Ji(a i,a-i) := C(ai ,a-i) -C(a?, a-i),
Ji(a) = N i(»(a)
1.
V. DESIGNING COST FUNCTIONS TO IMPROVE THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we propose a new strategy for designing player cost functions in distributed engineering systems with the goal of improving the tradeoff between the price of anarchy Optimal Nash Equilibrium Fig. 2 . Unbounded price of anarchy for reverse carpooling game with cost function defined as marginal contribution to true system cost C . (9) iEN to balance the true cost with the desire to penalize stable solutions requiring longer than necessary paths. Here a~1 is a constant. This potential function incorporates the true system cost, the total number of transmissions that each player uses in his chosen path, and a parameter a to weigh the two terms differently. In the reverse carpooling problem, each players marginal contribution to the potential function (9) takes the form -1) (C(a) -C(a?,a-i) ) ' (10) where (C( a) -C(a?, a-i) ) is the player's marginal contribution to the system cost, as defined in (7). An alternative representation of the cost in (10) is
We omit the proof of Proposition 3 as it is identical to the proof of Proposition 1 in [19] . The cost functions in (8) guarantee the existence of a potential game for every possible choice of ¢. However, the efficiency of a cost function design is always measured with respect to the true system cost C. Therefore, the central design choice when using the potentially wonderful life cost functions is to select the ¢ that yields the best tradeoff between the price of anarchy and price of stability.
As shown in Section IV, setting ¢ to C yields good performance in price of stability but poor performance in price of anarchy. In our example, the poor price of anarchy results from the possible existence of stable solutions using very long paths when stable solutions requiring only very short paths are also available. We therefore consider the potential function ¢ defined as and price of stability. Building upon the results in [19] , our approach is to define each player's cost function as the marginal contribution to a global cost function ¢ : A --+~that is different from the true system cost C . We call the resulting cost functions potentially wonderful life cost functions since they employ the wonderful life strategy but can be chosen to be distinct from the true global cost function. We start with the price of stability. Since the reverse carpooling game with cost functions (7) is a potential game with potential function C , for any game G E g, any action profile that minimizes the system cost is a pure Nash equilibrium; hence, PoS(Q) = 1. To show that the price of anarchy is unbounded, consider the following example of a reverse carpooling game with 2 players as shown in For simplicity, we refer to al and a2 as the top paths and ai and a~as the bottom paths.
where (ai) and 1{.} is the indicator function. In (7) , a player is assigned a cost of 1 for each directed transmission in his path where the number of players using the transmission in his direction is strictly greater than the number of players using the trans-
Otherwise, the player is assigned a cost of O. Unfortunately, the worst case Nash equilibria for the reverse carpooling game with cost functions as in (7) are not efficient as shown in the following theorem. 
Cost Matrix
System Cost C There are two Nash equilibria of this game: (i) each player selects the bottom path, which yields a system cost of 2 (neither player has the opportunity to reverse carpool) and (ii) each player selects the top path, which yields a system cost of j + 1 since each player reverse carpools on the interior j -1 vertices {Vb ...,Vj-l}. Therefore, the price of anarchy for this game is PoA(G) = (j + 1)/2. Since j is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
• Fig. 3 . Worst case example: Price of anarchy for a E [1, 2] Therefore, the system cost of an equilibrium is bounded above by (13)
Optimal Equilibrium
Combining (12) with (13) , we obtain . To see that this bound is tight , consider the example in FIgure 3 , where each edge segment consists of m internal nodes which are not explicitly highlighted in the figure . Eight players are located at the eight exterior nodes . Each player's destination is the exterior node two hops clockwise from the player's source. Suppose each player has two available paths to his destination: (i) traverse two segments clockwise on the exterior or (ii) traverse two segments through the interior. If each player traverses the exterior path , the system cost is • Theorem 4 is a negative result in the sense that it demonstrates that the worst case equilibrium can achieve a cost two times~he cost of the optimal solution when a E [1 ,2] (and even higher when a~ [1, 2] ). This implies that the worst-case equilibrium solution may be no better than the solution where each player takes his shortest path and no player carpools. Our next result is more positive, showing in particular when a = 2 that the best equilibrium has a cost at most 50% higher than the cost of the optimal solution. Recall that the price of anarchy and p~ice. of stability are worst case measures, so many networks do significantly better than this worst case bound. . 
v [vx,vy ]EI (ai )
In (10), a player is assigned a cost of a for each directed transmission in his path where the number of players using the transmission in his direction is strictly greater than the number of players using the transmission in the opposite direction, i.e.,
Otherwise, the player is assigned a cost of 1. This cost effectively approaches the previous design in (7) when a approaches 00. Let a op t E arg minaEA C (a) be any opti~il assignment and a n e be any Nash equilibrium. For any a~1 and any Nash equilibrium, each player's cost satisfies Ji(a ne ) :::; a min II(ai)l, (11) ( a, v[vy,v x ] ) . Trivially, the total system cost of a Nash equilibrium is no less than the system cost of an optimal assignment, i.e., C(a n e )~C(a o Pt ) . The system cost at the optimal allocation satisfies C(a o Pt )~' "~min II(ai)l· (12) 
This bound represents the system cost resulting from an assignment where each player selects his shortest path, i.e., a path consisting of the minimal number of nodes, and reverse c~ools~t each tran~mission in his path. Note that achieving t~IS cost In general IS not possible using reverse carpooling SInce a player can never carpool at his originating vertex. However, in the ensuing analysis, we ignore these "edge" effects, thereby deriving loose bounds. Our upper bound on the system cost associated with ã a~h~quilibrium is highly dependent on a. potential function implies that any action profile that minimizes the potential function is also an equilibrium, i.e., any action profile a E arg minaEA ¢(a) constitutes an equilibrium.
We next use this fact to bound the price of stability.
Let a ne E {a E A : ¢(a) = miniiEA¢(a)} be a Nash equilibrium that minimizes the potential function and a opt E {a E A : C (a) = miniiEAC (a)} be an optimal action profile.
Then C(a ne) 2: C(a oPt). Also, since a ne minimizes ¢, we have ¢(a oPt) 2: ¢(a ne). Expanding out the potential function and simplifying we obtain 
C(a oPt) -a
We do not provide the proof of the tightness of this bound because of space limitations.
• The tradeoff between the price of anarchy and price of stability for this cost design is illustrated in Figure 4 . Notice that as a ----; 00, we effectively recapture our original design and obtain a price of stability of 1 and an unbounded price of anarchy. Using this design, we can improve the price of anarchy at the expense of some degradation in the price of stability. In particular, we can reduce of price of anarchy from 00 to 2 by allowing the price of stability to increase from 1 to 1.5. Furthermore, in [12] we proved that there are no alternative cost designs independent of the network structure that yield a better relationship between the price of anarchy and price of stability than the design set forth in this paper.
The approach to network coding considered in this paper is not restricted to the network coding problem with unicast users and reverse carpooling coding opportunities. Our approach can also be applied to other problems by characterizing the decision makers, their possible choices (or some subset thereof), and a desired system cost that depends on the collective behavior of all players.
